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Abstract 
We provide evidence from a field experiment — a correspondence study — on age 
discrimination in hiring for retail sales jobs.  We collect experimental data in all 50 states and 
then relate measured age discrimination — the difference in callback rates between old and 
young applicants — to variation across states in antidiscrimination laws offering protections to 
older workers that are stronger than the federal age and disability discrimination laws.  We do a 
similar analysis for nonexperimental data on differences across states in hiring rates of older 
versus younger workers.  The experimental evidence points consistently to evidence of hiring 
discrimination against older men and more so against older women.   However, the evidence on 
the relationship between hiring discrimination against older workers and state variation in age 
and disability discrimination laws is not so clear; at a minimum, there is not a compelling case 
that stronger state protections reduce hiring discrimination against older workers.  In contrast, the 
non-experimental evidence suggests that stronger disability discrimination protections increase 
the relative hiring of older workers. 
Citation 
Neumark, David, Ian Burn, Patrick Button, and Nanneh Chehras. 2016. “Do State Laws 
Protecting Older Workers from Discrimination Laws Reduce Age Discrimination in Hiring?  
Experimental (and Nonexperimental) Evidence.” Ann Arbor, MI. University of Michigan 
Retirement Research Center (MRRC) Working Paper, WP 2016-349. 
http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/pdf/wp349.pdf  
Authors’ acknowledgements 
We received generous support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Social Security 
Administration, through a grant to the Michigan Retirement Research Center.  The views 
expressed are our own, and not those of the Foundation or of the Social Security Administration.  
This study was approved by UC Irvine’s Institutional Review Board (HS#2013-9942) 
Introduction 
Age discrimination may make it difficult for policymakers to encourage increased 
employment of older workers, to help address population aging.  Indeed, policymakers may want 
to consider whether supply-side reforms that increase incentives to work longer should be 
complemented by stronger laws protecting older workers from discrimination in the labor 
market.  To that end, this study does two things.  First, it significantly builds upon a large-scale 
field experiment to measure age discrimination in hiring.  Second, it studies whether stronger 
laws protecting older workers from discrimination in some U.S. states reduce hiring 
discrimination against older workers.  Because many seniors transition to part-time or shorter-
term “partial retirement” or “bridge jobs” at the end of their careers (Cahill et al., 2006; Johnson, 
2014), or return to work after a period of retirement (Maestas, 2010), new hiring of older 
workers is likely to be essential to significant lengthening of work lives.   
We focus not only on age discrimination laws, but also on disability discrimination laws.  
As argued in Neumark, Song, and Button (forthcoming) and Stock and Beegle (2004), disability 
discrimination laws may be important in protecting older workers, in particular, from 
discrimination.  Disabilities that can limit work and hence trigger protection by disability 
discrimination laws rise steeply with age, especially past age 50 or so (e.g., Rowe and Kahn, 
1997). Correspondingly, employer expectations that a worker will develop a disability in the near 
future should also rise steeply with age.  Indeed, disability discrimination laws may do more to 
protect many older workers than age discrimination laws.  Many ailments associated with aging 
have become classified as disabilities (Sterns and Miklos, 1995).  This can give some older 
workers an option of pursuing discrimination claims under either the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), or the corresponding 
state laws.  The combined effect of potential coverage under both age and disability 
discrimination laws may be to increase protections.  For example, the ADA does more to limit 
defenses against discrimination claims.1  A disability discrimination claim does require, of 
course, proving a disability, but as we shall see, this can be substantially easier under state 
disability discrimination laws than under the ADA.2   
It may seem obvious that stronger discrimination protections for older or disabled 
workers will increase hiring of older workers.  However, these laws may be ineffective at 
reducing or eliminating age discrimination in hiring.  Enforcement relies in large part on 
potential rewards to plaintiffs’ attorneys.  In hiring cases, it is difficult to identify a class of 
affected workers, which inhibits class action suits and thus substantially limits awards.  In 
addition, economic damages can be small in hiring cases because one employer’s action may 
extend a worker’s spell of unemployment only modestly.  Terminations, in contrast, can entail 
substantial lost earnings and pension accruals.  Moreover, it could be worse: if age 
discrimination laws fail to reduce discrimination in hiring, but make it harder to terminate older 
workers, these laws could actually deter hiring of older workers (Bloch, 1994; Lahey, 2008a; 
Posner, 1995).  
To garner evidence on whether stronger age and disability discrimination laws increase 
hiring of older workers, we marry two efforts in this paper.  First, we substantially extend a 
recent large-scale resume correspondence study (Neumark, Burn, and Button, 2015), from 12 
                                                     
1 Unlike the ADEA, the ADA does not include an exception for bona fide occupational qualifications 
(BFOQs).  BFOQ exceptions arise when age is strongly associated with other factors that pose legitimate 
business or safety concerns (e.g., Stock and Beegle, 2004; Posner, 1995; Starkman, 1992).  Furthermore, 
age-related disabilities might be judged as amenable to “reasonable accommodation” by employers under 
disability discrimination laws, which usually require “reasonable accommodation” of the worker, making 
it much harder to justify an apparently discriminatory practice on the basis of business necessity (Gardner 
and Campanella, 1991).   
2 Under the ADA and similar state laws, plaintiffs need to prove that they have a condition that 
“…substantially limits one or more major life activities…” (42 U.S. Code §12102 (1)): This has proved 
difficult, leading plaintiffs to lose the vast majority of cases (Colker, 1999). Even with the definition of 
disability being broader now after the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), proving coverage is not 
easy for many conditions, unlike coverage under the ADEA which is obvious. 
cities in 11 states to all 50 states (although we do not cover all the occupations included in the 
previous study).  The evidence from the resume correspondence study provides direct measures 
of discrimination in hiring.  Second, we utilize information on state age discrimination laws that 
extend beyond the federal ADEA and state disability discrimination laws that extend beyond the 
ADA to study the relationships between these state laws and the direct measures of age 
discrimination in hiring from the field experiment.3  Our focus is on discrimination against job 
applicants ages 64 to 66, who are at or near the age of retirement.   
Finally, we also provide some parallel findings from nonexperimental evidence on the 
relationships between relative hiring of older workers and these state laws.  In contrast to this 
nonexperimental evidence, the experimental evidence circumvents issues of differences across 
states in which types of older workers, or how many older workers, seek employment.  While the 
experimental evidence relates state antidiscrimination laws to explicit measures of hiring 
discrimination, the nonexperimental evidence could be more relevant to the policy question of 
whether stronger antidiscrimination laws would lengthen work lives, although it may be less 
likely to be causal.  
Correspondence Study Evidence on Age Discrimination 
Experimental audit or correspondence (AC) studies of hiring are generally viewed as the 
most reliable means of inferring labor market discrimination (e.g., Fix and Struyk, 1993).4  
                                                     
3 There is nonexperimental evidence that these state laws affect labor market outcomes for older or 
disabled worker.  Neumark and Song (2013) find that the effects of increases in the Social Security Full 
Retirement Age on work and later retirement were larger in states with age discrimination laws that are 
stronger than the federal ADEA.  Other analyses of state age and disability discrimination laws (a 
nonexhaustive list) include Neumark et al. (forthcoming), Jolls and Prescott (2005), Lahey (2008a), Stock 
and Beegle (2004), and Button (forthcoming).  We do not review this evidence here; the reader is referred 
to those papers.  We are aware of only two other papers that look at variation in experimental evidence on 
discrimination across jurisdictions with different anti-discrimination laws — Tilcsik’s (2011) study of 
discrimination against gays, and Ameri et al.’s (2015) study of discrimination against the disabled.   
4 For discussions of why, see, for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) and Neumark 
(forthcoming).  For critiques of this evidence, see Heckman and Siegelman (1993) and Heckman (1998).   
While observational studies try to control for productivity differences between groups, AC 
studies create artificial job applicants in which there are intended to be no average differences by 
group, so that differences in outcomes likely reflect discrimination.  Audit studies use actual 
applicants coached to act alike, and capture job offers, whereas correspondence studies create 
fake applicants (on paper or electronically) and capture “callbacks” for job interviews.  
Correspondence studies can collect far larger samples of job applications and outcomes, 
especially using the Internet. Because of the time costs of interviews, even large-scale, expensive 
audit studies typically have sample sizes only in the hundreds.  Correspondence studies also 
avoid “experimenter effects” that can influence the behavior of the actual applicants used in audit 
studies (Heckman and Siegelman, 1993).  For these reasons, we use a correspondence study in 
this paper. 
There is past evidence on age discrimination in employment using correspondence study 
methods.  The three main earlier studies, plus one recent study, point to substantial age 
discrimination in hiring for both men and women (Bendick, Jackson, and Romero, 1997; 
Bendick, Brown, and Wall, 1999; Riach and Rich, 2010; Lahey, 2008b; Farber, Silverman, and 
von Wachter, 2015).  The recent Neumark et al. (2015) study was the first to focus on workers at 
or above the age of eligibility for Social Security benefits.  Moreover, it addressed sources of 
bias in the estimates from these past studies that could be in either direction.   
One issue is the practice of giving older and younger applicants similar labor market 
experience, consistent with the standard paradigm in correspondence studies.  (One cannot, of 
course, match on the high experience of older applicants.)  However, the absence of relevant 
experience commensurate with an older applicant’s age may be a negative signal,5 and on real-
                                                     
5 Researchers are aware of this problem.  Bendick et al. (1997) had both older and younger applicants 
report 10 years of similar experience on their resumes.  However, they had the resumes for older 
 
world resumes older applicants tend to report experience commensurate with their age.  Neumark 
et al. (2015) addressed this question by using a variety of resume types for older workers, 
including some with experience commensurate with age, which we argued was more consistent 
with the central policy and legal questions regarding discrimination, and some with low 
experience matched to that of younger applicants, which hews more closely to the classic 
correspondence study paradigm.  For one occupation (janitors), matching on low experience 
generated spurious evidence of discrimination against older male workers.  However, for the 
retail sales occupations on which we focus in this paper, there was no such evidence.   
Second, Heckman and Siegelman (1993) and Heckman (1998) have demonstrated that if 
the groups studied have different variances of unobservables, experimental estimates of 
discrimination can be biased in either direction (formally, it is unidentified) — the “Heckman 
critique.”  This problem may be especially salient with respect to age, as the human capital 
model predicts greater dispersion in unobserved investments among older workers (Mincer, 
1974; Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2006).  If the average resume quality in the study is low 
compared to the distribution of resumes employers actually observe,6 then the high variance 
group is more likely to exceed the threshold for hiring or a callback, creating a bias in favor of 
hiring older workers, and hence a bias against finding evidence of age discrimination.  This 
problem was addressed by using a method developed in Neumark (2012), which is explained in 
more detail later in the paper.  Neumark et al. (2015) found that the results for the sales 
occupations we study in the present paper are sensitive to correcting for this source of bias, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
applicants indicate that they had been out of the labor force raising children (for the female executive 
secretary applications), or working as a high school teacher (for the male or mixed applications).  Lahey 
(2008b) studies women, for whom she argues that time out of the labor force is less likely to be a negative 
signal.  She then includes only 10-year job history for all applicants (in part based on conversations with 
three human resources professionals she cites who said 10-year histories were the “gold standard”).  
However, the older resumes in either study could convey a negative signal. 
6 As one example in a different context, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004, p. 995) claim that they tried to 
avoid over-qualified applicants who employers might not bother trying to hire. 
although they also noted that the evidence for these occupations might not be robust.  Hence, we 
build the same bias correction into the present study. 
Correspondence studies do not directly distinguish between taste discrimination and 
statistical discrimination.  However, both are illegal under U.S. law.7,8  Nonetheless, economists 
are interested in which model might explain discriminatory behavior, and the policy response 
may differ.  Moreover, in applying these methods to older workers, there are many plausible 
channels of statistical discrimination.  First, employers might expect older workers to have health 
problems, which could raise absenteeism, lower productivity, or pose accommodation costs.  
Second, employers might expect that older workers (our highest age range is 64-66) would be 
near retirement, and hence be less likely to want to invest in them.  Third, an older applicant with 
experience commensurate to their age applying for the same job as a younger applicant might be 
viewed as less qualified or having less potential, because he or she has been at that job level for 
longer – i.e., has a slower “speed of success” (Tinkham, 2010).  And fourth, employers may 
make assumptions about skill differences across cohorts – perhaps most important that older 
applicants have fewer computer skills.   
We cannot definitively rule out a role for these explanations of the evidence – and as we 
noted above, it does not matter from a legal perspective.  Nonetheless, Neumark et al. (2015) 
present a number of types of evidence suggesting that these potential sources of statistical 
discrimination do not play much of a role.  Some of these are based on evidence external to the 
field experiment.  For example, with respect to separations, younger workers are also likely to 
                                                     
7 EEOC regulations state: “An employer may not base hiring decisions on stereotypes and assumptions 
about a person's race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), national origin, age (40 or older), 
disability or genetic information” (http://www1.eeoc.gov//laws/practices/index.cfm?renderforprint=1, 
viewed September 27, 2015).  
8 Customer discrimination is also illegal.  For a number of cases showing failure of defenses based on 
customer preference, see https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/initiatives/e-
race/caselist.cfm?renderforprint=1#customer (viewed September 26, 2016).   
leave a job; although this is for other jobs rather than retirement, the reason for turnover is 
irrelevant to the employer.  In 2015:Q1 data from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators, the 
separation rate (relative to beginning-of-quarter employment) was 9.9 percent for workers ages 
55-64, and 18.7 percent for workers ages 25-34 (our youngest age range is 29-31).9  Other 
evidence comes from the study.  For example, the study also used resumes with different kinds 
of “bridging” or partial retirement behavior, which we know is sometimes associated with 
declining health (Johnson, Kawachi, and Lewis, 2009; Johnson, 2014).  Since employers should 
know this from past experience, if declining health is an issue, older applicants with “bridge 
resumes” should experience lower callback rates than other older applicants; but they do not.10   
The Experimental Design 
The present study builds on the approach and findings from the prior study.  The 
extension to all 50 states is critical for studying the effects of antidiscrimination laws.  At the 
same time, the extensive resources required to extend to all 50 states necessitated omitting some 
of the occupations included in the previous study.  In particular, we omit administrative assistant, 
security, and janitor jobs, and focus only on jobs in retail sales.  A clear implication of this 
limitation is that the evidence must be regarded as a case study, which may not generalize to 
other low-skill jobs.11  On the other hand, of the jobs included in Neumark et al. (2015), retail 
sales is the one for which both male and female applicants were submitted, so in the present 
study we obtain evidence on whether there are difference in the results for men and women.  In 
addition, given the evidence from Neumark et al. (2015) that in retail sales there was no 
difference in measured age discrimination whether high-experience or low-experience resumes 
                                                     
9 See http://qwiexplorer.ces.census.gov/#x=0&g=0 (viewed August 11, 2016). 
10 The reader is referred to Neumark et al. (2015) for discussion of additional evidence on statistical 
discrimination, as well as other potential challenges to the validity of interpreted differences in outcomes 
by age as discrimination.  
11 These kinds of studies typically use a very limited number of jobs.  For example, Farber et al. (2015) 
focuses only on age discrimination against women in administrative assistant jobs.   
were used for older applicants, in this paper we use low-experience resumes that match those of 
younger applicants.  This simplified the resume creation because a long work history did not 
have to be developed for the older applicants.      
Basic Analysis Framework  
The core analysis uses probit models for callbacks (C) as a function of dummy variables 
for age (S for older/senior) and observables (from the resumes) X.  The latent variable model (for 
C*) is  
(1)        Ci* = α + γSi + Xiδ + εi. 
In this basic model, the null hypothesis of no discrimination implies that γ = 0 (for older 
workers).  We always estimate the model for men and women separately. 
Here we outline the solution proposed in Neumark (2012) to address the Heckman 
critique; the original paper provides details.  To see the intuition behind the solution, recall that 
in a probit model, all that is identified is the ratio of the coefficient in the latent variable model to 
the standard deviation of the unobservable.  If we are willing to assume that δ in equation (1) is 
the same for younger and older applicants, then we can identify the ratio or the standard 
deviation of the unobservables, denoted σS/σY, from the ratios of probit coefficients older 
(senior) and younger applicants.  Thus, information from a correspondence study on how 
variation in observable qualifications is related to callback outcomes can be informative about 
the relative variance of the unobservables, and this, in turn, identifies an unbiased estimate of the 
effect of discrimination.  
The parameters are estimated using a heteroskedastic probit model with variance 
differing between younger and older applicants, and requires that at least one element of δ is 
equal for younger and older workers.12  With data on multiple productivity-related characteristics 
in X, there is an overidentifying restriction that the younger/older ratios of coefficients on any 
element of this vector are equal (to the same σSII/σYII).  The method also requires that at some of 
the applicant characteristics in X affect the callback probability (since if all the effects are zero 
we cannot learn about σSII/σYII from these coefficient estimates).  AC studies typically do not try 
to include variables that shift the callback probability, but instead create one “type” of applicant 
for which there is only random variation in characteristics that are not intended to affect 
outcomes.  However, we build this information into the study design, through assignment to 
some resumes of random elements of a vector of skills and other characteristics that should 
increase the callback probability.   
Resume Creation13  
The core of a correspondence study is the bank of resumes created for the artificial job 
applicants, since these resumes constitute the study data.  Our over-arching strategy was to use 
empirical evidence whenever possible in making decisions about creating the resumes, to 
minimize decisions that might limit the external or “comparison” validity of the results.  In many 
cases, this empirical evidence came from a large sample of publicly available resumes we 
downloaded from a popular national job-hunting website.  We downloaded a sample of more 
than 25,000 resumes, which we then scraped for a variety of types of information that we use in 
our resume design decisions.  In addition, we used public-use data to inform other issues in 
designing the resumes.      
                                                     
12 Thus, we could have begun by writing equation (1) with different coefficients on X for young and old 
workers.   
13 Many additional details are provided in the on-line appendix to Neumark et al. (2015), although with 
some differences because that paper presents a more complex study with additional occupations, 
additional resume types, etc.  We do not do anything in the current paper that extends beyond what was 
done in Neumark et al. (2015), but in some cases what we do is more limited.   
Basic Parameters 
Past studies have tended to use workers near age 30 as the young group, and workers near 
age 50 as the older group.  We include a similar age range for young workers (29-31), but 
compare results to older workers near the retirement age (64-66), who are the focus of policy 
efforts to respond to population aging.  We convey age on the resumes,via high school 
graduation year, which is common on the actual resumes we examined.  Given these age ranges, 
we chose common names (by sex) for the corresponding cohorts based on data from the Social 
Security Administration.  To focus on age, we chose first and last names that were most likely to 
signal that the applicant was Caucasian.  In response to each job ad, we send out a quadruplet of 
resumes consisting of a young and old male applicant and a young and old female applicant.     
Neumark et al. (2015) used the resume database to document that there are older 
applicants in retail sales, which is consistent with data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
Tenure Supplement showing a sizable representation of low-tenure older workers in the 
occupations that make up retail sales (retail salespersons and cashiers in the Census occupational 
classification).  Furthermore, the presence of older resumes on the resume posting website 
suggests that older workers do use on-line resources such as we use in this study to apply for 
jobs.  That paper also showed that retail sales capture appreciable shares of new hiring of older 
workers (and, of course, higher shares for the types of low-skill jobs that could plausibly be 
candidates for the study), and are in the upper tier in terms of the proportions of older people 
hired.14   
As noted above, we use cities in all 50 states to maximize external validity and to include 
                                                     
14 As additional evidence, Rutledge, Sass, and Ramos-Mercado (2016) compute the ratio of older (50-64) 
to prime age (30-49) hires in detailed occupations.  Retail sales is in the top 10, based on 1996-2012 CPS 
data.  They also report that the jobs into which older workers tend to be hired are much narrower for less-
educated workers.  Thus, although the study was never meant to provide representative evidence on all 
older job seekers, it seems to point to a significant part of the labor market, especially for less-skilled 
older workers.   
variation in antidiscrimination laws across all states.  This contrasts quite sharply with two of the 
past studies, which used only one or two cities (Lahey, 2008b; Bendick et al., 1999).  Because 
low-skill workers have low geographic mobility (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak, 2011), we also 
target the resumes to retail jobs in specific cities (one per state, see Table 2), with the job and 
education history on each resume matching the city from which the job ad to which we apply 
originates.  This was a factor underlying our decision to limit the analysis in this paper to retail 
sales jobs.  
Job Histories 
We relied on the actual job histories from the resume database, as well as other data 
sources, to create realistic job histories on our resumes.  Examination of our scraped resumes 
indicted that even in the low-skilled retails sales jobs we study, resumes are tailored to the jobs.  
To construct the job histories, we first pool job titles and descriptions from the actual resumes to 
create a set of entries in the retail field, with only minor changes such as phrasing or grammar for 
consistency.  We combined these job descriptions using the resume characteristic randomizer 
program created by Lahey and Beasley (2009).  The program randomized the combination of job 
titles and descriptions, and job tenures.  The program runs backward from the most current job to 
the beginning of the potential job history.  We had to build in a probability of a job ending, and 
experimented with the randomizer to choose a probability that appeared to create job histories 
similar to the resumes we downloaded, in terms of number of jobs held and average tenure on a 
job; this iterative process led us to choose a 15 percent annual probability that the program will 
end the current job and move on to the next randomly assigned job.   
We used the resume randomizer to produce a large number of job histories, and then 
selected a smaller set that looked the most realistic based on the resumes found on the job-
hunting website.  In particular, we dropped those that had very high levels of turnover.  From this 
sample of acceptable histories, we created four job histories for each city (and for each resume 
style we create).  We added employer names and addresses randomly to each job in our final job 
histories.  We identified 15 possible employers for each city and assigned each employer to a job 
description such that no employer is used more than once on the same resume, or more than once 
across resumes in the quadruplet of resumes that are sent to each employer.  We ensured that the 
job title and description was realistic for the employer.  In addition, we used employers that were 
active at the time and in the region listed, relying mainly on national chains that had stores in 
many cities. 
To mimic the seasonal pattern of job changes, we randomly drew the separation month 
for each job, except the most recently held job, from the distribution of job separation dates from 
the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS).  We use the distribution specific to 
“Retail Trade.”  During the course of the field experiment, every month we moved the ending 
date of the most recent job forward one month, so that durations did not lengthen during the time 
the experiment was in the field.  We distinguish resumes based on whether applicants are 
currently unemployed.  We assign all applicants within each quadruplet as either employed (the 
most recent job end date listed as “Present”), or unemployed, with 50 percent probability for 
each.15  When applicants are unemployed, the resumes indicate that their last job ended in the 
month prior to the job application.  
Skills 
To address the Heckman critique, we designate half the resume quadruplets to be high-
skilled and half to be low-skilled.16  For each type of high-skill resume, there are seven possible 
skills, five of which are chosen randomly (so that they are not perfectly collinear within a job).  
                                                     
15 We did not want random assignment of unemployed or employed resumes within a quadruplet to 
dominate the effect of age. 
16 Like for unemployment, we make the set of resumes sent to each employer uniformly high-skill or low-
skill because skill and age define different treatment groups.   
Included in the skill vector are five general skills: a Bachelor of Arts degree; fluency in Spanish 
as a second language; an “employee of the month” award on the most recent job; one of three 
volunteer activities (food bank, homeless shelter, or animal shelter); and an absence of 
typographical errors.17  Two skills of the seven are  specific to retail sales, including Microsoft 
Office and programs used to monitor inventory (VendPOS, AmberPOS, and Lightspeed). 
Additional Resume Elements  
There are a number of additional resume elements that we added.  Residential addresses 
with regard to socioeconomic status, demographic characteristics, and distance to jobs, were 
selected to be realistic for both older and younger applicants and the jobs to which we were 
applying, did not signal a race other than white, and were not likely to send an unusual signal 
(positive or negative) about the applicant.  The addresses were randomly assigned with respect to 
age, so there is no association between socioeconomic status of the neighborhood and age of 
applicant.   
We randomly assign high schools, and colleges and universities for the high-skilled 
resumes, for each city, to each applicant in our quadruplet.  We use local schools, colleges, and 
universities that were in operation since 1960 so that there is no possibility that an applicant 
attended a school that was not operational at the time.  We also restrict our schools to those with 
a significant share of white students. For smaller cities, this often limits the number of high 
schools or colleges that were available.  In six cities, we were only able to find two high schools 
that fit our criteria.  For the rest, we selected three different high schools.18  We avoided top-
tier/flagship universities whenever possible.  We also restricted our schools to not include 
                                                     
17 Thus, all low-skill resumes and the high-skill resumes not assigned this skill include two typos.  We use 
a missing space and a missing period, with one of these appearing for the most recent job, which 
employers are most likely to read.  These kinds of errors were more common on actual resumes than 
spelling errors.   
18 There were many cities for which we could not identify four high schools.  In such cases, employers 
should not be surprised to get two resumes listing the same high school.   
Historically Black Colleges.  In two states (Wyoming and Delaware), there was only one 
university that fit our criteria. 
Resume Quadruplets 
Each of the four resumes in the quadruplet was randomly assigned a different resume 
template, which ensured that all four resumes looked different.  Most other characteristics were 
randomly and uniquely assigned to each resume in each quadruplet to further ensure that the 
applicants were distinguished from each other, and that any resume characteristics that 
inadvertently were more or less appealing to employers were distributed randomly with respect 
to the four applicants in each quadruplet.  These characteristics included first and last names, 
school names, addresses, phone numbers, email address formats and domains, cover letter style, 
and the language describing jobs and skills.19   
Applying for Jobs 
We identify jobs to apply for using a common job-posting website.  Research assistants 
read the posts regularly to select jobs for the study, using a well-specified set of criteria.  Jobs 
had to be entry level (e.g., not managers or supervisors), and the ads could not require in-person 
applications, inquiries by phone, or require applicants to use an external website.  The ads could 
not require additional documents we had not prepared (e.g., a salary history, etc.), or skills that 
our resumes did not have.20      
Research assistants saved the list of jobs to apply for in a shared folder.  We wrote 
Python code to automate the application process from the jobs put in this shared folder.  This 
substantially reduced labor costs, removed human error such as attaching the wrong resume, and 
ensured that jobs applications used a uniform procedure.  Using SQL, the code matched the job 
                                                     
19 The on-line appendix from Neumark et al. (2015) provides examples of resume types exhibiting these 
and other variations.  
20 A number of other exclusion criteria are outlined in the on-line appendix, as are other quality-control 
procedures we implemented, and checks on them, regarding the job application process. 
ad data to the applicant based on city and date. Each day was randomly assigned a different 
quadruplet of resumes in terms of skill levels, and employed or unemployed.  Within each 
quadruplet the order of resumes was randomized.  The code ran every other day and added 7 to 8 
hour delays between applications to the same jobs.     
Sample Size 
In an experiment, it is important not to continue to collect data until the estimated 
differences become statistically significant.  We had an explicit data collection plan that covered 
two academic quarters, in which we collected as much data as the available job ads would allow.  
No data were analyzed until the data collection was complete.  We ended up sending out 14,428 
applications to 3,607 jobs.  
Collecting Responses 
Responses to job applications could be received by email or phone.  All responses were 
forwarded to a central email account, with voicemails arriving as attachments.  We then read 
each email and listened to each voicemail to record the response.  We then used additional 
information to match a response to a specific job ad, using information on the job ads recorded 
during the job application process.   
If the email was sent as a reply to the job-listing website submission, then the email also 
contained a unique id number for the job ad.  Sometimes firms responded directly to the 
individual, in which case we had to use other information to match to the specific job.  Phone 
call responses conveyed less information.  Every voicemail contained the phone number of the 
firm calling and the phone number on the resume they were trying to contact.  The automated 
voicemail message instructed firms to include their name and their number in their message.  
Identifying information that was extracted from a voicemail included, when possible, the firm 
name, applicant name, the job title, and any other information that could be used to narrow down 
the list of possible job ads (e.g., how long ago they received the resume).  The information 
extracted from the voicemail was used to match each voicemail to a job ad.  Table 1 reports the 
distribution of responses by phone or email (or both).   
Each response was coded as an unambiguous positive response (e.g. “Please call to set up 
an interview”), an ambiguous response (e.g. “Please return our call, we have a few additional 
questions”), or an unambiguous negative response (e.g. “Thank you for your interest, but the job 
has been filled”).  To avoid having to classify subjectively the ambiguous responses, they were 
treated as callbacks;21 the negative responses were treated the same as no callbacks.   
Nonexperimental Evidence 
Although our paper emphasizes experimental evidence from the correspondence study, 
we also present some parallel evidence on hiring behavior using data from the Quarterly 
Workforce Indicators (QWI)22 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2016).  The QWI are a set of 
economic indicators including employment, job creation, and employment flows.  The version of 
the QWI that we use reports by age group and sex, tabulated to the state level.  We use the hiring 
rate variable that measures hires as a percent of average employment.23  The data only permit 
broader age groups than the ages we use in our experiment (29-31 and 64-66).  We use 25-34 
year-olds as our young group, and two alternative older groups: 55-64, and 65-99.  We restrict 
attention to data on the retail sales industry (NAICS codes 44-45), to match the experimental 
data.  We use data for the first three quarters of 2014 — the most current data recently available; 
the experimental data were collected from early February to early July of 2016.   
The QWI data on hiring do not provide the same information as the experimental 
                                                     
21 The ambiguous responses are 7.8% of all cases coded as positive callbacks. 
22 These were downloaded from Cornell University’s Virtual Research Data Center (R2015Q2 release).  
By downloading data from the Cornell Virtual RDC Web site, we acknowledge support from NSF grant 
#SES-0922005 that made these data available. 
23 This and other QWI variables are discussed in-depth in http://lehd.ces.census.gov/doc/QWI_101.pdf 
(viewed September 25, 2016). 
evidence on callback rates.  In particular, the QWI hiring rates do not hold characteristics of 
young and old applicants fixed (which we do on the resumes, in the experimental data).  In 
addition, the QWI data can be influenced by whether people in different age groups look for new 
jobs, whereas in the experimental data this does not affect the results since we send out 
applicants of both ages.24   
Nonetheless, it is of interest to compare the results using the two different data sources.  
If the evidence is similar, it might suggest that we do not necessarily need experimental data to 
study the effects of antidiscrimination laws on discriminatory behavior.  On the other hand, the 
analysis using the two data sources might be viewed as answering different questions.  
Policymakers focused just on boosting hiring of older workers might in fact be more interested in 
the effects of antidiscrimination laws on hiring of older workers relative to younger workers — 
without regarding to changes in the composition of who looks for work, etc. — than in how 
otherwise identical applicants are treated.     
This does raise one important caution, however, about our analysis of both the 
experimental and the nonexperimental data.  In particular, the measured variation is cross-
sectional, not longitudinal.  In the experimental data, this is dictated by the collection of data 
over a short period.25  However, the ability to study the effects of current variations in state 
antidiscrimination laws is severely limited, because there are very few changes in these laws in 
recent decades (Neumark and Song, 2013; Neumark et al., forthcoming).  Thus, both types of 
evidence can potentially reflect other factors correlated with both outcomes for older workers 
                                                     
24 As a concrete example, part of the motivation for the restaurant audit study in Neumark (1996) was that 
expensive restaurants claimed they do not hire women as wait staff because women do not apply.  By 
sending both male and female applicants in the experiment, the paper showed that to some extent, at least, 
there was discrimination against female applicants when they did apply.   
25 For an interesting example of correspondence study evidence collected before and after a policy change 
(in the context of hiring differences of those with and without criminal backgrounds), see Agan and Starr 
(2016).  
and antidiscrimination laws.  
Coding of Antidiscrimination Laws  
Our coding of age discrimination laws and disability discrimination laws was developed, 
and is fully described in Neumark and Song (2013) and Neumark et al. (forthcoming); these 
papers also report some analyses of the effects of these laws, albeit using only nonexperimental 
data.  The compilation of information on these laws entailed extensive background research on 
state statutes and their histories, culled from legal databases including Lexis-Nexis, Westlaw, 
and Hein Online, as well as many other sources.   
The current laws are reported in Table 2.26  We focus on the two aspects of age 
discrimination laws that the past research suggested were important.  The first is the minimum 
firm-size cutoff for the law to apply.27  We use a firm-size cutoff of fewer than 10 workers to 
capture state laws that extend to substantially smaller firms (the minimum for the ADEA to 
apply is 20).  The second is whether compensatory or punitive damages are allowed, which they 
are not under federal law.28      
State disability discrimination laws are sometimes stronger than the federal ADA in three 
principal ways, all captured as well in Table 2.  As with age laws, there is a minimum firm size 
                                                     
26 Table 2 reveals that the distribution of stronger protections across states does not reflect the usual 
pattern related to generosity of social programs, minimum wages, etc.  For example, some southern states 
have among the strongest anti-discrimination protections.   
27 For example, in Florida a worker who works at a firm that employs fewer than 15 employees is not 
covered under the Florida state law.  On the contrary, all employees in Colorado are covered by state law 
because it is applicable to all firms with at least 1 employee.   
28 See United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (2002).  Some states require proof of 
intent to discriminate in order for compensatory or punitive damages to be awarded, whereas others 
require “willful” violation.  Because the federal law allows additional liquidated, nonpunitive damages 
(double back pay and benefits) when there is “willful” violation, the question of whether the state requires 
intent or willful violation may seem to be potentially relevant in deciding whether a state law offers 
greater protection.  However, willful violation is a much stricter standard than intent (Moberly, 1994).  
Moreover, compensatory or punitive damages are almost certainly greater than liquidated damages, and 
they can be much greater.  As a consequence, a state law that provides compensatory or punitive 
damages, whether or not this requires proof of intent or willful violation, clearly entails stronger remedies 
than the federal law. 
to which disability discrimination laws apply.  The minimum firm size for the ADA to apply is 
15; in our analysis we distinguish states with a firm size minimum lower than 10, the same as for 
age-discrimination laws.  There is also variation in damages, through higher or uncapped 
compensatory and punitive damages, relative to the capped damages available under the ADA.  
We distinguish states with larger damages than the ADA; we base this classification on punitive 
rather than compensatory damages, since punitive damages are likely to drive large judgments.   
Finally, state laws vary in terms of the definition of disability.  Most states adopt the 
ADA definition, either explicitly or via case law.  Some states use a laxer definition, changing a 
key part of the definition of disability from “substantially limits one or more major life 
activities” to either “materially limits” (Minnesota) or just “limits” (California).  Other states 
vary the definition of disability by requiring that the disability be “medically diagnosed” without 
regard to whether the impairment limits major life activities (Long, 2004).  Table 2 includes 
information on both dimensions of the definition of disability, and we use both in our analysis.   
Results  
Basic Callback Rates 
Table 3 reports raw differences in callback rates by age, and statistical tests of whether 
callback rates are independent of age.29  In Panel A, for males, we find strong overall evidence of 
age discrimination, with callback rates statistically significantly lower by 7.6 percentage points 
for older workers compared to younger workers, or 30.4 percent lower.  The evidence in Panel B, 
for females, similarly points to age discrimination.  The absolute difference is a bit larger (8.5 
percent), although it is more similar in relative terms because the callback rate is about 3.5 
percentage points higher for women than for men.  These results are similar to those in Neumark 
                                                     
29 This test treats the observations as independent.  In the regression (probit) analyses that follow, the 
standard errors are clustered appropriately.   
et al. (2015), although there the callback differential was larger for women (about 10 percent 
versus 6 percent for men).30  
In correspondence studies, there is a question of what evidence on callbacks tells us about 
hiring.  For example, if employers believe there is age discrimination, then they may expect older 
applicants to be more likely to respond positively to a callback.  Nondiscriminatory employers 
might then direct more callbacks to older workers, which would generate a bias against finding 
evidence of age discrimination (although employers might do the opposite if they have a target 
share of older worker hires).  However, there is evidence that differences in callback rates 
accurately reflect hiring discrimination.  The Bendick et al. (1999) audit study that captured 
differences in outcomes at different stages of the application process found that three-quarters of 
the overall discriminatory difference in treatment occurred at the preinterview stage.31  Thus, 
there is good justification for assuming that our results for callbacks would carry over to job 
offers, although of course the magnitudes could differ.  
Multivariate Estimates  
Table 4 reports results of probit estimates for callbacks (equation (1)), showing marginal 
effects.  In each case, we first report results with controls for the state, the order in which 
applications were submitted, current employment/unemployment, and skills.  We then add 
controls for an extensive set of resume features listed in the table notes.  The random assignment 
of age to resumes in AC implies that the controls should not affect the estimated differences 
associated with age, and that is reflected here, as the estimates in Table 4 are very similar to 
those in Table 3, with an estimated percentage point shortfall in callbacks of 7.5-7.7 percentage 
                                                     
30 Note that the callback rates at all ages are higher for women than for men.  Similarly, Neumark et al. 
(2015) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) did not find discrimination against women in retail.   
31 An employer is more likely to discriminate at the preinterview (callback) stage than at the interview 
stage.  Because company personnel systems often create data records for those interviewed, 
discrimination in offering jobs to applicants may be much easier to detect than discrimination in deciding 
who to call back for an interview.      
points for men, and 8.6-8.9 percentage points for women.   
In this and subsequent tables analyzing the experimental data, the estimates are clustered 
at the age-by-state level.  We do this because the policy variation we study when we estimate the 
effects of state antidiscrimination laws on callbacks varies by state and by age (since we include 
age-by-state interactions), and this clustering will then exactly parallel what we do with the 
nonexperimental data.32   
Given that the additional resume feature controls make essentially no difference to the 
estimates, nor should they, going forward we use the more parsimonious specifications in 
columns (1) and (3).  These specifications retain the skill variables we added to address the 
Heckman critique (as well as the unemployment and order of application variables, which may 
also function like the skill variables).   
Adding State Antidiscrimination Laws 
We next turn to the main contribution of this paper – the estimation of the effects of state 
antidiscrimination laws protecting older workers on callback rates for older relative to younger 
workers.  We do this by modifying equation (1) to include interactions of dummy variables for 
these state laws (in some cases a vector) with the dummy variable for older applicants.  Because 
we include state dummy variables, we do not include the main effects of the state 
antidiscrimination laws.  Excluding the state dummy variables and including the main effects of 
the laws would result in a less saturated models, whereas the models we estimate allow more 
flexibly for differences in callback rates for younger workers across states than only variation 
correlated with the state antidiscrimination laws.  Of course, we have to assume that state-by-age 
interactions are excluded from the model to estimate the interactive effects of interest.  Adding to 
                                                     
32 Absent this consideration, one might want to cluster at the level of the resume or the job ad.  In 
Neumark et al. (2015) we verified that the two alternatives have virtually no effect on the standard errors.     
equation (1) an ‘s’ subscript to denote states, and defining As as the dummy variable (or vector of 
dummy variables) capturing state antidiscrimination laws, we augment the model to be   
(2)        Cis* = α + γSis + Sis∙Asγ’ + Xisδ + εis, 
where, recall, X includes the state dummy variables.  Our interest centers, of course, on whether 
stronger state antidiscrimination laws are associated with differences in the relative callback rate 
of older workers, captured in γ’. 
The first estimates we report, in Table 5, add, separately, the two features of age 
discrimination laws on which we focus — a smaller firm-size cutoff and larger damages.  In 
Table 5, the main effects of “Old” refer to states where the federal law binds, and the interaction 
with the feature of the law considered captures the differential in the relative callback rate where 
there is a stronger state law.  For a lower firm-size cutoff, the estimated interaction for men is 
negative but insignificant, while the estimate for women is positive and statistically significant.  
The estimates for women imply that in the states where the federal law binds, the callback 
differential by age is quite a bit larger than for men (10.6 versus 6.3 percentage points lower).  
But it is not clear, a priori, why the estimated effect of the lower firm-size cutoff would be 
different for women than for men.  In the actual labor market, it is possible that older women on 
average apply to work at smaller firms.  But in the correspondence study that should not play a 
role, since all job ads receive two male and two female applicants.  The estimated interactions 
with the dummy variable for larger damages are small and insignificant (and negative) for both 
men and women.  
Table 6 turns to state disability discrimination protections.  This table is more 
complicated because there is a third feature of the laws that we study — the definition of 
disability — and because there are two different classifications of this definition.  Looking first 
at the results for the lower firm-size cutoff and larger damages, which are comparable to the 
features of age discrimination laws considered in Table 5, we find small and insignificant effects 
in three cases, but a positive and statistically significant effect of larger damages for older 
women.  This is different from the result for age discrimination laws where we found a positive 
and significant effect of a lower firm-size cutoff for women.  But it is similar in the sense that for 
women, but not for men, we find a positive and significant effect of some feature of state 
antidiscrimination laws that strengthens the law relative to the federal law.   
Columns (3), (4), (7), and (8) report estimates of the effects of a broader definition of 
disability on the relative callback rate for older workers.  Here, all the estimates are negative, but 
only one (for men, and for the medical only definition) is statistically significant.  The effect of a 
broader definition can, of course, cut two ways.  On the one hand it can extend protections and 
increase hiring.  But on the other hand, it could make employers warier of hiring an older worker 
who might suffer a health decline and become subject to state disability discrimination 
protections – in this case, more easily because of the broader disability definition.  
The previous two tables may not estimate the independent effects of each variation in 
state antidiscrimination protections, because the presence or absence of different features of state 
laws are correlated across states, as Table 2 indeed suggests.33  Thus, in Table 7 we add all the 
law interactions simultaneously.  Perhaps unexpectedly, the estimates are still relatively precise.  
For the age discrimination laws, we now get a clearer message, albeit still one that points to 
different effects for women versus men.  In particular, for women there is strong evidence that a 
lower firm-size cutoff increases the relative callback rate of older workers, and indeed the 
magnitude offsets a large share of the callback difference in states where the federal laws bind.  
For men, in contrast, the estimates are negative and statistically significant.  For larger damages, 
                                                     
33 For example, New Jersey has a lower firm-size cutoff and larger damages for both age discrimination 
and disability discrimination, and a broader medical definition, Rhode Island has the first four, but not a 
broader disability definition, and Nebraska has no stronger protections for either type of discrimination.   
the estimates are small and statistically insignificant.  For the disability discrimination laws, the 
effects of the firm-size cutoffs are reversed, with positive effects for men (significant only in 
column (1)) and negative effects for women (significant in both columns).  For women, however, 
the effect of state disability discrimination laws providing for larger damages are positive, and 
significant at the 10 percent level.  For the broader definition of disability, most of the estimates 
are small or insignificant, with the exception of the negative and significant effect for the 
medical-only broader definition of disability for men.   
Overall, the examination of the effects of stronger state age and disability discrimination 
protections on hiring of older workers provides a somewhat mixed message.  For men, most of 
the evidence points to negative effects; this is true for a lower firm-size cutoff for age 
discrimination, and the definition of disability that extends to medical issues.  There is one 
estimate that points to a positive impact for the firm-size cutoff for disability discrimination, but 
this finding is not robust.  Thus, for men, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that 
stronger antidiscrimination protections for older workers may deter hiring.  For women, the 
evidence is more mixed and harder to reconcile.  Indeed, the strongest evidence is for firm-size 
cutoffs, but the estimated effects are of different signs for age discrimination (positive) versus 
disability discrimination (negative).  And there is weaker evidence that larger damages for 
disability discrimination may increase hiring.  From this, we draw two key conclusions: (1) there 
clearly is not unambiguous evidence that stronger age and disability discrimination protections 
boost hiring of older workers; and (2) there is some evidence – most clear for men – that these 
laws may be more likely to reduce hiring of older workers.   
Correcting for Bias from Differences in the Variances of Unobservables 
We next turn to the estimates that are intended to eliminate the bias identified by the 
Heckman critique.  To briefly explain the procedure, we first estimate a probit model with the 
controls and their interactions with “Old” included.34  We then test the overidentifying restriction 
for the controls, to see whether the data are consistent with the effects for young and old 
differing in a way that is driven only by the difference in variance of the unobservables (that is, 
the ratios of effects for young and old workers are equal).35  It turns out that the overidentifying 
restrictions using all of the controls are not rejected by the data, so we do not have to narrow 
down the set of variables used to identify the relative variance.  We then estimate a 
heteroskedastic probit model that imposes equal coefficients of the controls in the latent variable 
model, with the variance of the residual differing between young and old workers.  The estimates 
of this model are used to estimate marginal effects, and to decompose the marginal effects to 
isolate the effects of the variables on the level of the latent variable, which are the unbiased 
estimates of discrimination.  (The decomposition also identifies the effect of “Old” via the 
variance, which, as explained in Neumark (2012), is an artifact of the study design using a very 
narrow range of resume quality.)36    
The results are reported in Table 8.  The upper rows of the table report the marginal 
effects corrected for bias.  The specifications are otherwise the same as those in Table 7, using 
all the laws simultaneously, and hence can be compared directly.  One result is that the estimates 
for the main effects of “Old,” which measure age discrimination in the states where the federal 
laws bind, becomes a little bit larger in absolute value for men (at least in column (1)), but quite 
                                                     
34 We do not report these results here.  It turns out that the skill variables have stronger effects on callback 
probabilities than we obtained in Neumark et al. (2015) using the same variables in our job applications 
for sales jobs.  That could be because of the smaller number of cities (12, in 11 states) to which we sent 
applications, especially given that New York and Los Angeles provided very large numbers of 
observations.   
35 To identify the effect of the old-state law interactions, we have to assume equal coefficients for the state 
dummy variables, so this restriction is simply imposed.  The overidentification test we use pertains to all 
of the other controls.   
36 This decomposition is unique when using the calculation of marginal effects that treats the variables as 
continuous, which is not standard, but has virtually no effect on the estimated marginal effects.  The 
standard calculation of the marginal effect for discrete variables does not yield a unique decomposition.   
a bit larger for women – by around 25 percent.  Thus, for these states the evidence of age 
discrimination always strengthens, although appreciably only for women.   
The third panel of the table reports the ratio of the standard deviation of the unobservable 
for old relative to young workers.  For men, this ratio exceeds 1.1 in column (1), and for women, 
it is larger still in both columns.  The larger standard deviations for older workers, coupled with 
the larger estimates of discrimination, are consistent with the resumes on average being of lower 
quality.  However, the estimated interactions between “Old” and the features of state 
antidiscrimination laws do not change much from correcting for the bias from different variances 
of the unobservables, consistent with the relative standard deviations of the unobservables being 
relatively close to 1.37   
Results for Nonexperimental Data 
Finally, we report results for the nonexperimental QWI hiring data.  Table 9 reports 
analyses that parallel Table 5 – considering each type of age discrimination law in isolation.  
Tables 10A and 10B report analyses that parallel Table 6 – considering each type of disability 
discrimination law in isolation.  And Table 11 parallels Table 7 in including all the laws 
simultaneously, alternating between the two ways that state disability discrimination laws 
broaden the definition of disability.   
Tables 9, 10A, and 10B paint a clear and unambiguous picture.  In every column, the 
provision of state age or disability discrimination laws that we consider has an estimated positive 
interaction with “Old,” implying that these provisions boost the relative hiring of older workers.  
                                                     
37 We found more evidence of bias in Neumark et al. (2015) – which only estimated the effects of age – 
with the bias correction strengthening the evidence of discrimination for women, and weakening it 
substantially for men.  Those estimates may have been less robust because of using many fewer states 
(cities), as well as because the skill variables had weak predictive power for callbacks in sales.  In 
addition, it is possible there was more bias because with fewer states, the resumes we sent out may have 
more uniformly been on one side of the distribution of resume quality that employers observe.  In both 
studies, our resumes used for different states were of uniform quality.  But if applicant quality differs 
across the states/cities, then by using more of them we may have reduced the bias.   
Moreover, nearly every estimated interaction is significant at the 5 percent level or less.   
Table 11, however, provides more reliable evidence by controlling of the different 
provisions of these laws simultaneously.  Interestingly, once we do this, the estimated 
interactions for the age discrimination law provisions are near zero and never statistically 
significant.  In contrast, a number of the estimated interaction effects for state disability laws are 
positive and significant, and many are quite a bit larger in magnitude than the estimates for age 
discrimination laws.  In particular, a lower firm-size cutoff for disability laws is associated with 
higher relative hiring of men, although this result is not significant or is only marginally 
significant in columns (3) and (4).  More robust is the evidence that larger damages for disability 
discrimination boost the relative hiring of older workers.  This finding is statistically significant 
in every case (for men and women) for the younger of the two older groups (ages 55-64), and for 
women, using both definitions of the older group the finding, is always significant at the 5 
percent level or better.  Finally, either of the two broader definitions are associated with higher 
relative hiring of older workers.  However, the effect is of a much larger magnitude and is much 
more statistically significant (always at the 1 percent level) using the broader definition that uses 
the laxer definition of limits.  For the broader definition based on the medical definition of 
disability only, only one estimate is statistically significant (for women 55-64, at the 5 percent 
level).  Thus, the nonexperimental data clearly provide stronger and more consistent evidence 
that state laws protecting older workers from discrimination boost hiring, compared to the results 
for the callback rates estimated from the experimental data.  Moreover, this evidence arises only 
for disability discrimination protections.   
Conclusions and Discussion 
In this study, we provide evidence from a field experiment — a correspondence study — 
on age discrimination in hiring for retail sales jobs.  The unique contribution of this paper is to 
collect experimental data in all 50 states, and then to relate the measure of age discrimination — 
the difference in callback rates between old and young applicants — to variation across states in 
antidiscrimination laws offering protections to older workers that are stronger than the federal 
laws.  We study both age discrimination and disability discrimination laws.  While age 
discrimination laws explicitly target discrimination against older workers, we argue that it is 
natural to expect disability discrimination laws to do far more to protect older workers than 
younger workers.  Finally, in addition to analyzing the experimental data, we also study 
nonexperimental data on differences across states in hiring rates of older versus younger 
workers.   
The experimental evidence points consistently to evidence of hiring discrimination 
against older men and more so against older women.   However, the evidence on the relationship 
between hiring discrimination against older workers and state variation in age and disability 
discrimination laws is not so clear.  Some protections appear to exacerbate the callback 
difference between older and younger workers — in particular, a lower firm-size cutoff for age 
discrimination laws and a broader definition of disability for men, and a lower firm-size cutoff 
for disability discrimination laws for women.  In contrast, there is some evidence that stronger 
protections are associated with less discrimination against older workers – for a lower firm-size 
cutoff for age discrimination laws and larger damages for disability discrimination laws for 
women.   
To summarize the experimental evidence, clearly this evidence does not support a general 
conclusion that stronger antidiscrimination protections reduce measured hiring discrimination 
against older workers.  Indeed, somewhat more evidence suggests that these stronger protections 
under state laws increase measured discrimination.  This latter effect is possible, because 
protections that might make it more difficult to terminate an older worker, or in the case of 
disability, raise future accommodation costs for employers, can deter hiring of the protected 
group, especially if the antidiscrimination laws are relatively ineffective at reducing 
discrimination in hiring while being more effective with regard to terminations.  However, the 
absence of consistent evidence in this direction ultimately makes us reluctant to draw strong 
conclusions from the relationship between measured discrimination against older workers and 
state antidiscrimination laws – except the “negative” conclusion that there is not a compelling 
case that these laws reduce hiring discrimination against older workers.   
The evidence from the nonexperimental data on hiring is quite different.  In particular, 
while the data on hiring rates yields little indication that stronger state age discrimination laws 
are associated with higher relative hiring of older workers, it generates quite unambiguous 
evidence that the relative hiring of older workers is higher in states with stronger protections 
against disability discrimination.  
The obvious question is why the answers from the experimental and nonexperimental 
data are different.  We do not necessarily anticipate the same answer.  If we did, there would be 
little need to carry out a correspondence study.  The experimental evidence provides a direct 
measure of hiring discrimination, whereas the hiring differences captured by the 
nonexperimental evidence can reflect compositional variation across states in which older 
workers look for work, as well as differences across states in the likelihood that older individuals 
look for work; the experimental variation eliminates both of these sources of variation.   
Perhaps the most natural explanation for the different results is that stronger state laws 
protecting older workers from discrimination do not have a clear causal effect on measured 
discrimination, but are more likely to be adopted where more older workers are looking for 
work, generating spurious evidence of positive effects on hiring rates.  It may make sense that 
these laws are less endogenous with respect to the age discrimination we measure with the 
correspondence study, since this discrimination is unlikely to be easily observed by 
policymakers, and may not be strongly correlated (and perhaps could be negatively correlated) 
with employment or hiring rates of older workers.  Alternatively, stronger state discrimination 
laws may have a positive causal effect on hiring through changing the composition of which 
older workers seek employment or more generally encouraging older workers to work, even 
though the laws do not reduce the discrimination between otherwise identical older and younger 
job applicants that the correspondence study measures.   
Under either interpretation, there is little basis from our evidence for concluding that 
stronger state laws protecting older workers from discrimination reduce age discrimination in 
hiring; under the second interpretation, however, they may still increase hiring of older workers 
via other channels.  It is possible that the latter effect is of more importance to policymakers 
trying to increase the employment of older workers, although the case for interpreting it as causal 
is weakened by the fact that we have only cross-sectional variation in state age discrimination 
laws.  There is past work on longitudinal variation in age and disability discrimination laws 
(from the advent of state laws and then federal laws) that likely provides better evidence on 
causal effects — albeit not with respect to the features of state laws we study in this paper.  This 
past work indicates that adoption of age discrimination laws boosted employment of older 
workers (Adams, 2004, Neumark and Stock, 1999).  However, the evidence is less clear for 
disability discrimination laws (e.g., Beegle and Stock, 2003; Kruse and Schur, 2003; Button, 
forthcoming), suggesting that the relationship we find between state disability protections and 
relative hiring of older workers may not be causal.  In that case, the evidence from our 
experimental data may, in fact, be more definitive, and there may not be much case for 
concluding that stronger state age and disability discrimination laws either reduce age 
discrimination in hiring against older workers, or more generally, increase hiring of older 
workers.    
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Table 1: Level of Matching of Callbacks 
 
Matched positive 
responses No responses Total 
Voicemail 1,614 N.A. 1,614 
Email 1,218 N.A. 1,218 
Both 438 N.A. 438 
All 3,270 11,158 14,428 
Notes: There are 3,270 matched responses to 14,428 resumes that were sent out.  
For responses received from employers, we tried to match each response to a 
unique job identifier.  We received three voicemails that we were unable to match 
to either a unique job identifier or to the resume that was sent.
 Table 2: State Disability and Age Discrimination Laws, 2016 
 Age discrimination laws Disability discrimination laws 
State (City) 
Minimum 
firm size 
Larger damages 
than ADEA 
Minimum 
firm size Larger damages than ADA 
Broader (medical) 
definition of disability 
Alabama (Birmingham) 20 No No law No law No law 
Alaska (Anchorage) 1 Yes 1 Yes No 
Arizona (Phoenix) 15 No 15 No (no punitive) No 
Arkansas (Little Rock) No law No law 9 No (same as ADA) No 
California (Los Angeles) 5 Yes 5 Yes (uncapped) No (“limits” only) 
Colorado (Denver) 1 No 1 No (same as ADA) No 
Connecticut (Hartford) 3 No 3 No (no punitive) Yes 
Delaware(Wilmington) 4 Yes 15 No (same as ADA) No 
Florida (Miami) 15 Yes 15 No (punitive capped at 
$100k) 
No 
Georgia (Atlanta) 1 No 15 No (no punitive) No 
Hawaii (Honolulu) 1 Yes 1 Yes (uncapped) No 
Idaho (Boise) 5 Yes 5 No (punitive capped at $10k) No 
Illinois (Chicago) 15 Yes 15 No (no punitive) Yes 
Indiana (Indianapolis) 1 No 15  No (no punitive) No 
Iowa (Des Moines) 4 Yes 4 No (no punitive) No 
Kansas (Wichita) 4 Yes 4 No (damages capped at $2k) No 
Kentucky (Louisville) 8 Yes 15 No (no punitive) No 
Louisiana (New Orleans) 20 Yes 20 No (no punitive) No 
Maine (Portland) 1 Yes 1 Yes No 
Maryland (Baltimore) 15 Yes 15 No (same as ADA) No 
Massachusetts (Boston) 6 Yes 6 Yes (uncapped) No 
Michigan (Detroit) 1 Yes 1 No (no punitive) No 
Minnesota (Minneapolis) 1 Yes 1 No (punitive capped at $25k) No (“materially limits” 
only) 
Mississippi (Jackson) No law No law No law No law No law 
Missouri (Kansas City) 6 Yes 6 Yes (uncapped) No 
Montana (Billings) 1 Yes 1 No (no punitive) No 
Nebraska (Lincoln) 20 No 15 No (no punitive) No 
Nevada (Las Vegas) 15 No 15 Yes No 
New Hampshire 
(Manchester) 
6 Yes 6 No (no punitive) No 
New Jersey (Trenton) 1 Yes 1 Yes (uncapped) Yes 
New Mexico 
(Albuquerque) 
4 Yes 4 No (no punitive) No 
New York (New York) 4 Yes 4 No (no punitive) Yes 
North Carolina 
(Charlotte) 
15 No 15 Yes No 
North Dakota (Bismarck) 1 No 1 No (no damages) No 
Ohio (Columbus) 4 Yes 4 Yes (uncapped) No 
Oklahoma (Oklahoma 
City) 
15 No 15 No (no punitive) No 
Oregon (Portland) 1 Yes 6 Yes (uncapped) No 
Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh) 4 No 4 No (no punitive) No 
Rhode Island 
(Providence) 
4 Yes 4 Yes (uncapped) No 
South Carolina 
(Columbia) 
15 No 15 No (same as ADA) No 
 
 
 
 
 Age discrimination laws Disability discrimination laws 
State (City) 
Minimum 
firm size 
Larger damages 
than ADEA 
Minimum 
firm size Larger damages than ADA 
Broader (medical) 
definition of disability 
South Dakota (Sioux 
Falls) 
No law No law 1 No (no punitive) No 
Tennessee (Memphis) 8 Yes 8 No (no punitive) No 
Texas (Houston) 15 Yes 15 No (same as ADA) No 
Utah (Salt Lake City) 15 No 15 No (no punitive) No 
Vermont (Burlington) 1 Yes 1 Yes (uncapped) No 
Virginia (Virginia Beach) 6 No 1 No (no punitive) No 
Washington (Seattle) 8 Yes 8 No (no punitive) Yes 
West Virginia 
(Charleston) 
12 No 12 Yes (uncapped) No 
Wisconsin (Milwaukee) 1 No 1 No (no damages) No 
Wyoming (Cheyenne) 2 No 2 No (no punitive) No 
Notes: State laws are as of 2016.  Age discrimination laws are from Neumark and Song (2013) and disability discrimination laws are 
from Neumark et al. (forthcoming), but are updated.  For the states listed as “Yes” under Larger Damages than ADA, but not uncapped, 
details are as follows: Alaska – uncapped compensatory damages, punitive damages capped above ADA levels; Maine – exceeds ADA 
cap for firms of 201+ employees; Nevada – uncapped compensatory damages except against government,  punitive damages capped at 
maximum of $300k and three times compensatory damages; North Carolina – uncapped compensatory damages except against 
government, punitive damages capped at maximum of $250k and three times compensatory damages.  
 Table 3: Callback Rates by Age 
 
 
Young 
(29-31) Old (64-66) 
Absolute 
(percentage point) 
difference in 
callback rate for old 
 
Percent difference 
in callback rate 
for old 
A. Males (N=7,212)   
Callback (%) No 75.01 82.61 -7.60 -30.42% 
Yes 24.99 17.39 
Tests of independence 
(p-value), young vs. old 
  
0.00 
  
B. Females (N=7,212)   
Callback (%) No 71.58 80.12 -8.54 -30.05% 
Yes 28.42 19.88 
Tests of independence 
(p-value), young vs. old 
  
0.00 
  
Notes: The p-values reported for the tests of independence are from Fisher’s exact test (two-sided).  There were no positive 
responses for West Virginia, so it drops out of the probit analysis in subsequent tables.  We therefore also drop West Virginia 
from this table to have results for the same sample; this has virtually no impact on the estimates in this table.  
 Table 4: Probit Estimates for Callbacks by Age, Marginal Effects  
 Males Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Callback 
estimates 
    
Old (64-66) -0.077*** 
(0.007) 
-0.075*** 
(0.006) 
-0.086*** 
(0.006) 
-0.089*** 
(0.006) 
Controls     
State, order,  
unemployed, 
skills 
X X X X 
Resume features   X  X 
Callback rate for 
young (29-31) 
24.99% 28.42% 
N 7,212 7,212 
Clusters 3,607 3,607 
Notes: Marginal effects are reported, computed as the discrete change in 
the probability associated with the dummy variable, evaluating other 
variables at their means.  Standard errors are clustered at the age-by-state 
level.  Significantly different from zero at 1-percent level (***), 5-percent 
level (**) or 10-percent level (*).  Resume features include: template; 
email script; email format; script subject, opening, body, and signature; 
and file name format.  See notes to Table 3.   
  
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Probit Estimates for Callbacks by Age, with Effects of State Age 
Antidiscrimination Laws Added, Marginal Effects  
 Males Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Callback estimates     
Old (64-66) -0.063*** 
(0.011) 
-0.067*** 
(0.010) 
-0.106*** 
(0.011) 
-0.085*** 
(0.007) 
Old (64-66) x Firm-
size cutoff < 10 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
 0.028** 
(0.013) 
 
Old (64-66) x 
Larger damages  
 -0.014 
(0.013) 
 -0.002 
(0.010) 
Controls     
State, order,  
unemployed, skills 
X X X X 
Callback rate for 
young (29-31) 
24.99% 28.42% 
N 7,212 7,212 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3 and 4.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Probit Estimates for Callbacks by Age, with Effects of State Disability 
Antidiscrimination Laws Added, Marginal Effects  
 Males Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Callback 
estimates 
        
Old (64-66) -0.070*** 
(0.011) 
-0.076*** 
(0.009) 
-0.070*** 
(0.007) 
-0.072*** 
(0.007) 
-0.084*** 
(0.010) 
-0.092*** 
(0.007) 
-0.083*** 
(0.006) 
-0.081*** 
(0.006) 
Old (64-66) x 
Firm size < 10  
-0.010 
(0.014) 
   -0.003 
(0.012) 
   
Old (64-66) x 
Larger damages  
 -0.004 
(0.015) 
   0.022** 
(0.013) 
  
Old (64-66) x 
Broader 
disability 
definition 
(medical only) 
  -0.034** 
(0.015) 
   -0.012 
(0.015) 
 
Old (64-66) x 
Broader 
disability 
definition 
(medical or 
limits) 
   -0.017 
(0.016) 
   -0.017 
(0.014) 
Controls         
State, order,  
unemployed, 
skills 
X X X X X X X X 
Callback rate for 
young (29-31) 
24.99% 28.42% 
N 7,212 7,212 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3 and 4.   
  
 Table 7: Probit Estimates for Callbacks by Age, with Effects of State Age and Disability 
Antidiscrimination Laws Added Together, Marginal Effects  
 Males Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Callback estimates     
Old (64-66) -0.057*** 
(0.014) 
-0.060*** 
(0.014) 
-0.099*** 
(0.011) 
-0.099*** 
(0.010) 
Old (64-66) x Age firm size 
< 10  
-0.047*** 
(0.011) 
-0.035*** 
(0.012) 
0.070*** 
(0.011) 
0.065*** 
(0.011) 
Old (64-66) x Age larger 
damages  
-0.002 
(0.014) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.000 
(0.012) 
Old (64-66) x Disability 
firm size < 10  
0.044*** 
(0.014) 
0.029 
(0.016) 
-0.059*** 
(0.012) 
-0.051*** 
(0.012) 
Old (64-66) x Disability 
larger damages  
-0.014 
(0.014) 
-0.005 
(0.016) 
0.025* 
(0.014) 
0.020* 
(0.012) 
Old (64-66) x Broader 
disability definition 
(medical only) 
-0.049*** 
(0.012) 
 0.014 
(0.013) 
 
Old (64-66) x Broader 
disability definition 
(medical or limits) 
 -0.021 
(0.019) 
 -0.002 
(0.014) 
Controls     
State, order,  unemployed, 
skills 
X X X X 
Callback rate for young 
(29-31) 
24.99% 28.42% 
N 7,212 7,212 
Notes: See notes to Tables 3 and 4.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Probit Estimates for Callbacks by Age, with Effects of State Age and Disability 
Antidiscrimination Laws Added Together, Marginal Effects, with Correction for Bias from 
Different Variances of Unobservables for Young and Old Applicants  
 Males Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Callback estimates 
(heteroskedastic probit, 
marginal effect via level) 
    
Old (64-66) -0.079** 
(0.034) 
-0.062* 
(0.035) 
-0.124*** 
(0.024) 
-0.127*** 
(0.024) 
Old (64-66) x Age firm size 
< 10  
-0.044*** 
(0.013) 
-0.035** 
(0.015) 
0.079*** 
(0.014) 
0.075*** 
(0.014) 
Old (64-66) x Age larger 
damages  
-0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
Old (64-66) x Disability 
firm size < 10  
0.044*** 
(0.015) 
0.028 
(0.016) 
-0.063*** 
(0.014) 
-0.055*** 
(0.014) 
Old (64-66) x Disability 
larger damages  
-0.016 
(0.015) 
-0.005 
(0.016) 
0.022* 
(0.013) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
Old (64-66) x Broader 
disability definition 
(medical only) 
-0.060*** 
(0.018) 
 0.010 
(0.013) 
 
Old (64-66) x Broader 
disability definition 
(medical or limits) 
 -0.022 
(0.020) 
 -0.007 
(0.014) 
Callback estimates 
(heteroskedastic probit, 
marginal effect via 
variance) 
    
Old (64-66)  0.024 
(0.036) 
0.003 
(0.036) 
0.026 
(0.024) 
0.030 
(0.024) 
Overidentification test: 
ratios of coefficients on 
skills for old relative to 
young are equal (p-value, 
Wald test) 
0.797 0.803 0.996 0.997 
Standard deviation of 
unobservables, old/young 
1.108 1.013 1.123 1.141 
Test: standard vs. 
heteroscedastic probit (p-
value, log-likelihood test) 
0.545 0.935 0.405 0.349 
Controls     
State, order,  unemployed, 
skills 
X X X X 
Callback rate for young 
(29-31) 
24.99% 28.42% 
N 7,212 7,212 
Notes: In this table marginal effects are computed as the change in the probability associated with the dummy variable, 
using the continuous approximation, evaluating other variables at their means; we use the continuous version of the 
partial derivative, because this version gives an unambiguous decomposition of the estimates from the heteroscedastic 
probit model (Neumark, 2012).  The overidentification test is based on interactions of the skill variables, order of 
application, and unemployment, with the dummy variable for old.  See notes to Tables 3 and 4.
 Table 9: Regression Estimates for Hiring by Age, with Effects of State Age Antidiscrimination 
Laws Added, QWI Data  
 Males Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Old age group 55-64 65-99 55-64 65-99 55-64 65-99 55-64 65-99 
Hiring rate 
estimates 
        
Old  -0.065*** 
(0.002) 
-0.060*** 
(0.003) 
-0.065*** 
(0.002) 
-0.060*** 
(0.002) 
-0.082*** 
(0.003) 
-0.081*** 
(0.003) 
-0.080*** 
(0.003) 
-0.080*** 
(0.003) 
Old x Firm-size 
cutoff < 10 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
  0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.015** 
(0.007) 
  
Old x Larger 
damages  
  0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
  0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
Controls         
State dummy 
variables  
X X X X X X X X 
Female         
Hiring rate for  
young (25-34) 
13.16% 13.75% 
N  294 294 
Notes: The sample includes hiring rate estimates from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators for 2014Q1, Q2, and Q3 for the retail 
sales industry (NAICS 44-45).  Estimates are specific to four cells: younger men (age 25-34), younger women, older men (age 55-
64 or 65-99), and older women.  All regressions include state fixed effects and are weighted by the employment level in each age 
group, gender, and state cell.  Standard errors are clustered at the age-by-state level.  We drop West Virginia to match our 
experimental results; the results are almost identical with West Virginia included. 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 10A: Regression Estimates for Hiring by Age, with Effects of State Disability Age 
Antidiscrimination Laws Added, QWI Data, Males  
 Males 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Old age group 55-64 65-99 55-64 65-99 55-64 65-99 55-64 65-99 
Hiring rate 
estimates 
        
Old  -0.067*** 
(0.002) 
-0.062*** 
(0.002) 
-0.064*** 
(0.001) 
-0.057*** 
(0.002) 
-0.062*** 
(0.002) 
-0.054*** 
(0.003) 
-0.065*** 
(0.001) 
-0.059*** 
(0.001) 
Old x Firm size < 10  0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
      
Old x Larger 
damages  
  0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.012* 
(0.007) 
    
Old x Broader 
disability definition 
(medical only) 
    0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
  
Old x Broader 
disability definition 
(medical or limits) 
      0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
Controls         
State dummy 
variables  
X X X X X X X X 
Female         
Hiring rate for  
young (25-34) 
13.16% 
 
N  294  
Notes: See notes to Table 9. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 10B: Regression Estimates for Hiring by Age, with Effects of State Disability Age 
Antidiscrimination Laws Added, QWI Data, Females  
 Female 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Old age group 55-64 65-99 55-64 65-99 55-64 65-99 55-64 65-99 
Hiring rate 
estimates 
        
Old  -0.084*** 
(0.003) 
-0.083*** 
(0.003) 
-0.079*** 
(0.002) 
-0.077*** 
(0.003) 
-0.077*** 
(0.003) 
-0.073*** 
(0.005) 
-0.081*** 
(0.002) 
-0.079*** 
(0.002) 
Old x Firm size < 10  0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
      
Old x Larger 
damages  
  0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.020** 
(0.010) 
    
Old x Broader 
disability definition 
(medical only) 
    0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
  
Old x Broader 
disability definition 
(medical or limits) 
      0.021*** 
(0.004) 
0.030*** 
(0.008) 
Controls         
State dummy 
variables  
X X X X X X X X 
Hiring rate for  
young (25-34) 
13.75% 
 
N  294 
Notes: See notes to Table 9. 
 
 Table 11: Regression Estimates for Hiring by Age, with Effects of State Age and Disability 
Antidiscrimination Laws Added Together, QWI Data  
 Males Females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Old age group 55-64 65-99 55-64 65-99 55-64 65-99 55-64 65-99 
Hiring rate estimates         
Old -0.069*** 
(0.002) 
-0.065*** 
(0.003) 
-0.067*** 
(0.002) 
-0.064*** 
(0.003) 
-0.087*** 
(0.003) 
-0.088*** 
(0.005) 
-0.085*** 
(0.003) 
-0.086*** 
(0.004) 
Old x Age firm size < 10  -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
Old  x Age larger 
damages  
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Old x Disability firm 
size < 10  
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
Old  x Disability larger 
damages  
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
Old  x Broader disability 
definition (medical only) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
  0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
  
Old x Broader disability 
definition (medical or 
limits) 
  0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
  0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.025*** 
(0.006) 
Controls         
State dummy variables X X X X X X X X 
Hiring rate for  young 
(25-34) 
13.16% 13.75% 
N 294 294 
Notes: See notes to Table 9. 
 
